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 *I.E.L.R. 110  Summary  
West Africa with its well-endowed natural resources remains a highly attractive investment 
opportunity. That is, to investors who are not deterred by the economical and political 
challenges of these countries including the responsibilities of governments to ensure that 
the people are not losing out of the benefits derived from the exploitation of these 
resources. The investor's overall responsibility in the extractive industries has been 
scrutinised over recent years and their corporate social responsibility to their shareholders 
to make as much profit as possible no longer exonerate them from their responsibility 
towards the host country in which they operate. In view of the question as to why there 
exists such a huge interest in doing business in some of the most hostile regions of the 
world such as West Africa with all the typical problems associated with the oil industry, this 
article considers some of the pertinent issues concerning the governance of the petroleum 
sector in West Africa, including the attraction and the role of the state in the development 
of the resources; and the challenges of governance and transparency. Concluding that with 
the abundance of natural resources, the huge interest in the development of the region's oil 
and gas resources, the various international initiatives on public sector reform, 
transparency and anti-corruption, West African oil-producing countries (supported by the 
IOCs operating in the region) have a golden opportunity to tackle the above problems, 
transform their national economies and enhance the lives of all their citizens. 
 Background  
A number of developing countries, endowed with a rich abundance of natural resources 
(including oil and gas) and a range of related problems, attract not only many international 
oil companies (IOC's) but also increasingly national oil companies (NOC's) and 
governments (with their own investment agendas that view developing countries as a 
major potential source of energy to supply their own ever-increasing and demanding 
domestic markets).1 In 2003 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard that the 
major West African oil producing countries can make an important contribution to US 
energy security, mainly because they are not far from the US markets and they are not 
affected by the difficult peculiar security issues of the Middle East even though they have 
considerable problems of their own, which cannot be ignored.2 
Today the majority of the world's potential and proven oil and gas resources are found in 
developing countries.3 According to BP's latest survey the world's proved oil reserves are 
divided as follows: the developed countries of North America (70.9) and Europe and 
Eurasia (142.2) have a share of 213.1 thousand million barrels of proven reserves. 
However, a larger percentage of proven oil reserve base of 1070.5 thousand million barrels 
is located in the developing countries of South and Central America (132.2), Asia and 
Pacific (42), Africa (142.2) and the largest share of the reserves are located in the Middle 
East (754.1).4 UNCTAD highlighted the “large imbalances” in the global consumption, 
production and reserves of oil and gas in that developed countries consume more than half 
of global oil and gas output, while they account for only a quarter of production and that 
less than 8 per cent of the world's remaining proved reserves of oil and gas are found in 
these countries.5 It is generally accepted that resources in developed countries are being 
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depleted faster than that of developing and *I.E.L.R. 111  transition economies, which 
means that the former will have to rely increasingly on oil and gas imported from the 
latter.6 
A notable trend already exists of international oil companies (IOCs) leaving established, 
mature regions and competing for the vast under-explored and rich oil and gas resources 
most commonly found in developing countries with hostilities (e.g. Iraq,7 Caspian Sea,8 
West and Central Africa)9 and also in frontier regions (Arctic).10 
The West African region's abundance in natural resources increasingly attracts major 
IOCs.11 The oil-producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, 
Cameroon and Congo have been the main focus of the international oil industry for many 
years.12 Other West African countries like Ghana, and further down the coastline 
Namibia13 and South Africa,14 boast with favourable investment frameworks and are also 
successfully competing for the attention of the international oil industry. The region further 
attracts direct government interest from developed and developing countries alike 
including the United States, UK, Norway, Russia as well as countries afar afield as China, 
Korea, India and Japan.15 At the same time, the region is not immune from the alarmingly 
extensive range of problems associated with the oil and gas sector in most petroleum 
producing countries, including corruption, civil unrest, kidnappings, sabotage, labour 
disputes, expropriations, nationalisations, disputes over ownership claims between central 
governments and indigenous and local communities, the lack of basic services and 
infrastructure in rural communities, health and safety concerns, environmental problems, 
etc.16 
 The great attraction to oil and gas resources in hostile regions  
The following discussion considers the question as to why there is such a great attraction to 
the oil and gas resources of unstable and hostile regions. 
Generally, the attraction for the world's oil and gas resources depends inter alia on the 
availability of abundant reserves that could be exploited very cheaply,17 the shifting 
relations between the producing (mainly developing) and consuming (mainly developed) 
countries, between traditional international oil companies (IOCs) and state-owned national 
oil companies (NOCs).18 Additionally, numerous statements are made that the world oil 
demand was declining faster than previously as a slowing global economy erodes 
consumption and keeps oil prices under pressure. Thus, for the foreseeable future the 
market is expected to remain under pressure from the uncertainties in the economic 
outlook, demand deterioration and the substantial “overhang” in supply.19 Furthermore, a 
number of commentators argue that geological scarcity will at some point make it 
impossible for global petroleum production to avoid falling, heralding the end of the oil age 
and, potentially, economic catastrophe: the so called “peak oil” theory.20 However, the 
argument against the “peak oil” theory is that the “resource endowment of the planet is 
sufficient to keep *I.E.L.R. 112  up with demand for decades to come” and that after 
careful examination of the facts it shows that most arguments about peak oil are based on 
anecdotal information, vague references and ignorance of how the oil industry goes about 
finding fields and extracting petroleum.21 
Secondly, a large number of importing consuming countries will only achieve a sense of 
energy security through direct imports from producing developing countries, also called 
“petrostates”. These “petrostates” are in many cases plagued by a range of uncertainties 
including hostilities which are closely related to disputes over the ownership and control of 
oil and gas resources within the national boundaries.22 Oil and gas-related disputes are 
found worldwide in the petroleum rich regions, however it seems that companies are 
increasingly attracted to these areas.23 The regions are commonly faced with systematic 
disruption and civil unrest that remain the most serious threat to the business operations of 
international and national oil companies. It is often said that the diminishing oil and gas 
supplies are located in hostile or unstable regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin 
America, former Soviet Union (region around the Caspian Sea) and parts of Asia.24 Most of 
the above incidents are taken very seriously because of their contribution towards the 
instability in these regions and the impact on the international industry (including the oil 
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price) such as the prolonged and systematic attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in 
Nigeria.25 
Thirdly, in recent years the level of competition for oil and gas resources in the 
“petrostates” has intensified at an alarming rate and developed into a strategic but 
complex matter for many reasons, including key structural changes in government policies 
in most producing nations. Walde suggested that these changes are increasingly obvious in 
times of sustained upwards trends in petroleum prices whereby the governments of 
petroleum producing countries would inevitably seek for fundamental revisions of the 
terms under which international investors carry out their original investment in the oil and 
gas sectors.26 Examples of increasing government intervention is highly obvious in a 
number of countries including the West African oil producing region and varies from 
renegotiation of oil contracts,27 direct threats to stop oil production,28 the use of oil 
revenues to strengthen the armed forces instead of uplifting the social fabric of society,29 
demands for localisation, commitments from companies to train and employ local citizens, 
transfer of businesses to local partners and the transfer of part control of oil fields to 
national company. Additionally, some “undemocratic” governments permit foreign 
investment by IOCs even when these companies face embargoes applied by their home 
countries because of international sanctions against these countries.30 
Furthermore, the attraction to the oil and gas resources is increasingly influenced by the 
emergence of new players in the global market. Additionally, the shifts in the policies of oil 
and gas producers mean that traditional conglomerates from industrialised nations are 
facing increasing competition in the race to access the world's reserves.31 Major 
international oil companies who once dominated the entire oil industry are now competing 
with smaller independents for favourable positions with host *I.E.L.R. 113  governments 
in developing countries.32 National oil companies (NOCs) as agents of their governments 
have adopted a more proactive role in the industry at home and abroad. Some of the 
wealthiest NOCs (“the new seven sisters”) are based in developing and transition 
economies and include Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia); Gazprom (Russia); CNPC (China); 
NIOC (Iran); PDVSA (Venezuela); Petrobras (Brazil) and Petronas (Malaysia).33 Recently 
these NOCs have established themselves among the main foreign investors in selected oil 
and gas-producing countries and operate alongside traditional companies (IOCs) from the 
developed countries such as British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Total, etc. 
National companies from China, including the China Petroleum Corporation and from India, 
the state owned Indian company Oil & Natural Gas have recently won licensing interests in 
West Africa.34 In fact South Korea, India and China are three countries that have been 
pursuing oil acreage all over West Africa, and they have penetrated the Nigerian market, 
the largest in Africa, with diplomatic, political and financial support of their 
governments.35 
The above examples demonstrate that the oil and gas business is very attractive, although 
these projects are inherently risky propositions affected by the political situation in the 
country and increasingly by internal and regional conflicts as well. Additionally, the returns 
on the capital investment for oil and gas projects could be highly unpredictable in countries 
that use natural resources as political leverage. This scenario just adds to further 
uncertainty with price volatility and concerns of security of supply. Important factors that 
also contribute towards the disruption of oil and gas operations are civil disturbances and 
conflict, social and environmental concerns, weak macroeconomic environment, an 
ineffective legal and regulatory framework and inadequate public service. In many 
countries these factors inevitably lead to unwarranted government intervention and abuse 
of power, which may at some stage affect the country's attractiveness and the “investment 
decision process” in the oil and gas industry. 
It is therefore suggested that in order to address the concerns in the “investment decision 
process” and for example maintain the attractiveness in the oil and gas industry, focus 
should be placed on governance and transparency issues, community consultation and the 
re-distribution of revenues.36 The issue of community consultation or public participation 
in the development of natural resources has been recognised as an important human right, 
which may take different legal and political forms such as citizen involvement, indigenous 
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people's rights, local community rights, sustainable development agreements, public 
hearings, consultation, advisory councils, right to information, right to justice, decisional 
transfers, benefits sharing, etc.37 Governments are increasingly under pressure to 
address the many socio-economic problems affecting their local communities and at the 
same time reverse the petroleum resource curse that is so prevalent in their oil producing 
regions. As will be seen later on, there is a strong drive towards greater transparency and 
accountability in the industry with the adoption of more anti-corruption treaties, laws and 
initiatives and the increase number of investigations and prosecutions concerning the oil 
industry. 
 The role and responsibility of the State in the development of the oil and 
gas resources  
The increasing opportunities in West Africa have to be set against a background of the 
major risks (including corruption, security and political instability) that are prevalent in the 
region and the role and responsibility of the state in the oil and gas industry. 
Generally, the state asserts and confirms through the national constitution or relevant 
legislation that all oil and gas resources found within its territory, both onshore and 
offshore, is the exclusive property of the State. For example, in Ghana Art.257(6) of the 
1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and s.1 of the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law (PNDC Law 84) vest all natural resources, including all petroleum, existing 
in its natural state within the jurisdiction of Ghana in the *I.E.L.R. 114  State to be 
administered for and on behalf of the people of Ghana.38 Similarly, in Nigeria, 1969 
Petroleum Act s. 1 vests the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon 
any lands in the State and this provision has been repeated in the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic.39 
This affirmation of the rights in oil and gas is based on the concept of “sovereignty”, which 
plays an important part in the law and stems from the internationally recognised principle 
of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources”.40 The purpose of the Principle is to 
emphasise the importance of sovereignty over natural resources and to encourage 
international cooperation in the economic development of developing countries. It also 
emphasises the recognition and respect of the sovereign right of every state to freely 
dispose of its wealth and its natural resources in accordance with national interests, and 
respect for the economic independence of States. The Principle stipulates a duty on states 
to exercise their right to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources in 
the interest of their national development, and of the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned. However, in some countries, certain individuals including presidents, ministers 
responsible for oil and gas, officials from government departments and the national oil 
companies are behaving as if the oil and gas resources belong to them with no 
accountability to the people of the land. Most West African countries have expressly 
adopted the above principle in their national constitutions and petroleum legislation. 
Companies wishing to invest in countries located in West Africa need to be aware of the 
roles and the involvement of the key organs of State including the President, the ministers, 
relevant government departments and even the national oil company that are involved in 
the regulation of the national oil and gas sector. The following examples show that the 
government minister responsible for oil and gas is empowered by the petroleum law to 
issue the licence award to the company (usually an IOC) after a process of negotiation that 
would allow the IOC the right to participate in the exploration and production of oil and gas 
(in some cases with the NOC as local partner). 
• In Ghana, any person or entity who intends to explore and exploit for oil and gas must as 
a starting point negotiate with the “Republic of Ghana through the Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation” (GNPC) for a petroleum agreement by submitting an application 
for licence to GNPC.41 
• In Nigeria, the Federal Government participates in the oil industry through the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The NNPC was formed in 1977 and inherited the 
commercial activities of the former NOC (NNOC) and the supervisory/regulatory role of the 
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Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources. However since 1984, the NNPC undertakes 
commercial activities, whilst the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources acting through 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is the regulatory authority. Additionally, the 
minister responsible for oil and gas is usually supported by a number of government 
departments responsible for various aspects of the oil and gas industry (taxation, 
environment, health and safety, etc.) as well as the national oil company that increasingly 
play a participatory role in exploration and production operations alongside the IOC.42 
• In Angola, the Ministry of Petroleum is responsible for the regulation of the industry, the 
Ministry of Finance regulates the financial aspects of the operations, including tax and the 
NOC (Sonangol) is the title-holder of the mining rights. Sonangol is the exclusive 
concession holder for all the liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon exploration onshore and on 
the continental shelf of Angola.43 
• In Equatorial Guinea, the Ministry of Mining, Industry and Energy is responsible for the 
regulation of the oil and gas sectors. The licensing arrangement is based on the 1982 Model 
Production Sharing Contract and Getotal, the National Oil Company, *I.E.L.R. 115  which 
is equally owned by the government and Total, is responsible for the downstream activities 
in the country. In 1998, a liberal regulatory regime and profit-sharing arrangements 
including an updated Model Production Sharing Contract with provisions for the 
participatory role of the NOC was introduced to stimulate more exploration and production 
activities.44 
From the above examples, it is clear that the NOC serves as an “instrument of government 
policy”, the “regulator” of the oil and gas industry, the “promoter” of oil and gas exploration 
and at the same time is also the “holder” of petroleum rights which are usually non 
transferable.45 Any international company that wishes to carry out petroleum activities, 
and who is willing to contribute the necessary capital, resources and the expertise for the 
successful and efficient exploration and production of oil and gas, could only do so through 
contractual arrangements with the national company. The relationship between the IOC 
and the NOC is usually regulated through a joint venture relationship and in some countries 
on the basis of a production sharing agreement (e.g. Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
etc.) with the national petroleum entity as the local partner.46 This contractual relationship 
between the IOC and the NOC is also increasingly common in countries that have adopted 
royalty-based licensing systems (e.g. Namibia and South Africa) whereby the IOC as the 
licence holder could enter on a voluntary basis into contractual arrangements with the 
national company.47 All the major international oil companies have a strong presence in 
Africa but there are also an increasing number of local national petroleum companies that 
now require to be taken on board in licence and contractual arrangements to exploit the 
national resources. Various schemes focusing on “indigenisation”, local content, etc. have 
been introduced to promote the participation of local companies in all phases of the oil and 
gas industry and the development of a local services industry.48 
In many instances, the NOC, minister responsible for oil and gas and the government 
departments are supported by a civil service plagued with corruption, misallocation of 
resources, ineffective service delivery, sub-minimum-wage compensation, and 
recruitment and promotion of unqualified staff. These problems have been difficult to solve 
because those involved have a vested interest to help keep the authoritarian regimes in 
power. Furthermore, bureaucratic budgets reflect the relative powers of bureaucratic elites 
rather than the broader public interest; discretionary import licences and other economic 
controls are targeted to obedient partisans; patrimonial recruitment and promotion reward 
loyalists with jobs, bureaucratic influence, and fringe benefits; ethnic fragmentation, and 
the lack of rule of law, transparency and accountability, allows dysfunctional regimes to 
carry on with the above practices and avoid effective scrutiny and sanction from the 
broader public.49 
The general view is that through donor assistance (technical and financial) by international 
organisations most African countries have been able to adopt various programmes to 
create more accountable and transparent professional civil services.50 However, some 
argue strongly against donor assistance because it distorts the real picture and crowds out 
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financial and social capital and feeds corruption especially in the oil and gas and natural 
resources sector.51 Many African countries are still relying heavily on aid from foreign 
donors despite being rich in minerals and other natural resources. Strong criticisms are 
therefore directed not only to the intentions of the international donors and the corrupt 
governments in place but also towards the international investors in Africa's natural 
resources industries of employing underhand tactics to escape their tax liabilities, which 
inevitably result in the loss of substantial tax revenue to the government.52 
The general role of business and the investor's overall corporate responsibility in the 
extractive industries has been scrutinised over recent years so that their corporate social 
responsibility to their shareholders to make as much profit as possible no longer 
exonerates them from their contractual obligation and social responsibility towards the 
host country in which they operate.53 One view is that in order to attract the much-needed 
foreign investments, governments have no choice but to grant concessions to 
unscrupulous investors. It has been suggested that a number of leading IOCs are far from 
transparent when it *I.E.L.R. 116  comes to the payments they make to resource-rich 
countries, leaving the door open to corruption and hampering efforts to fight poverty.54 
Efforts at creating transparent and professional civil services are mixed and rely mainly on 
major internal changes including high-level leadership and political commitment; effective 
civil service reform; downsizing; performance management; capacity building; and 
effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The reality is that these efforts are 
lacking in most oil-producing West African countries that are still struggling to implement 
basic civil service and infrastructure development programmes. This brings us to our next 
discussion on the issue of “governance” in the context of the oil and gas industry. 
 The challenge of governance over West African oil and gas resources  
 
The meaning of governance 
The words “governance” and “govern” are derived from the Latin word “gubernare” 
meaning “rudder” conveying the idea of “steering”.55 The term “governance” was first 
used in 12th-century France, where it was a technical term designating the administration 
of baillages or bailiwicks.56 There already exists a variety of definitions of governance, 
however they are often rather vague.57 Some of the developments in the private sector 
corporate governance, for example audits and risk management, have been adopted by 
some governments in their public sector.58 For the purpose of this discussion, governance 
involves the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised 
including how governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.59 For the purposes of this section the focus will be on the “capacity of the 
government to effectively manage its resources” including the control of “corruption in the 
oil and gas industry”. The World Bank defines governance as “… the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes 
(i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the 
capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound 
policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them.”60 
The UNDP defines governance as the “exercise of political, economic and administrative 
authority to manage a nation's affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal 
rights and obligations, and mediate their differences”.61 The ADB defines governance as 
the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's social and 
economic resources for development. Governance means the way those with power use 
that power”.62 
Governance over Africa's oil and gas resources 
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Africa is the world's second largest continent with over 1 billion inhabitants living in 54 
countries, yet it is by far the world's poorest inhabited continent.63 Although certain 
countries are enjoying rapid growth, the majority of African countries are developing more 
slowly than current *I.E.L.R. 117  trends in the rest of the world.64 Many reasons are 
given for this including the legacy of colonialism, corruption, civic unrest and war, debt and 
low investment, decaying infrastructure and poor social services, famine, national 
disasters and harsh environments. Nigeria, Angola and Sudan have bitter experience of the 
negative impacts of oil production and these problems are beginning to be shared by 
emerging oil producers such as Equatorial Guinea, Chad,65 and Sao Tome and Principe. 
There is not one state in West Africa that has not been affected or suffered from some form 
of conflict in the past decade. The main conflict areas in the region have been Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria (Niger 
Delta), Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But against this setting, Africa 
possesses great potential primarily because of its vast reserves of natural resources. Most 
of the African countries are well endowed with natural resources such as oil and gas (and 
other important minerals), however, the efforts at fully exploiting these resources still 
requires major investment by international companies and the necessary government and 
local support in the host country.66 Investment in the oil and gas industry therefore 
receives a high priority by all African governments which are clearly competing with each 
other for foreign investment.67 
The relationship between oil and development in Africa has been investigated from all 
different angles.68 A recent African Development Bank (ADB) report on Africa's oil and gas 
resources examined the continent's major challenges and opportunities in the energy 
sector (including the impacts of rising oil and gas prices in African net importing countries 
with limited or no resources) with the purpose of the establishment of a proposed African 
Petroleum Fund (APF).69 Another recent study by the Ford Foundation (FF) analysed the 
negative relationship between the presence of oil and development and examined the way 
in which political power is exercised in four West African oil rich countries.70 Furthermore, 
in contrast to the ADB focus the FF report seeks to identify mechanisms through which to 
change this dynamic and concluded that rather than focus on the economic and financial 
environment problem it should be analysed from a political context within which decisions 
are made about resource revenue.71 In identifying the processes by which stakeholders, 
such as civil society, citizens and external actors engage with the State, the political arena 
is highlighted as the avenue through which change may be possible.72 Thus, it transpired 
that aspiring political parties and governments are therefore competing for the interests of 
the foreign investor including those from governments that have a strong desire for Africa's 
natural resources. At the forefront of the scramble for West Africa's oil and gas resources 
are the United States and some Asian countries, notably China which is moving 
aggressively to satisfy its growing domestic requirements for energy and natural 
resources.73 Some commentators suggest that this situation is leading to a confrontation 
with the United States over the region's attractive resources.74 IOCs linking with NOCs and 
independent local entities suggest the creation of new alliances between majors, 
newcomers, governments and national oil companies from all different backgrounds 
amidst the danger of conflicts and potential disputes that directly relates to the exploration 
and exploitation of West Africa's oil and gas resources. Despite the many problems 
associated with the exploitation of Africa's natural resources including recent violent 
conflicts, the West African region, in particular, continues to attract substantial 
investments in oil exploration and production activities.75 There is an ever-growing focus 
on the Gulf of Guinea as one of the most prolific oil and gas provinces of the world resulting 
in increasing investment and activity in the region.76 It is widely suggested that at the end 
of 2008 Africa possess 10 per cent of the world's proven oil with 125.6 billion barrels of 
oil.77 In 2008 Africa produced 10285 thousand barrels per day about 12.4 per cent of 
world production mainly from the following countries: Algeria (2.2 per cent), Angola (2.3 
per cent), Cameroon (0.1 per cent), Chad (0.2 per cent), *I.E.L.R. 118  Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville) (0.3 per cent), Egypt (0.9 per cent), Equatorial Guinea (0.5 per cent), Gabon 
(0.3 per cent), Libya (2.2 per cent), Nigeria (2.7 per cent), Sudan (0.6 per cent), Tunisia 
(0.1 per cent) and other African countries (0.1 per cent). In 2008 Nigeria was Africa's 
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largest producer with 2,170 thousand barrels per day, followed by Algeria (1,993); Angola 
(1,875); Libya (1,846); and Egypt (722). Apart from Angola and Nigeria who are members 
of OPEC, the other West African producers include Equatorial Guinea (361); Republic of 
Congo (249); Gabon (235); Chad (127) and Cameroon (84).78 The above African 
countries find themselves at various stages of the oil extraction process and serve as good 
examples of how oil can shape the political landscape. 
 Selected West African oil and gas producing countries  
In addition to some of the examples already discussed, and for the purposes of this article 
the following major West African producing countries (including Ghana that will soon join 
this group as one of the main producers in West Africa) with active oil and gas industries 
but with a number of typical problems that are directly related to the issue of “governance” 
and the production of natural resources, will be briefly considered. These countries are 
Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Ghana. 
Angola 
Angola is a member of OPEC and is the second largest oil producer in West Africa after 
Nigeria.79 Angola's oil reserves are estimated at around 10 billion barrels of oil with recent 
discoveries that indicate a further potential of 20 billion barrels.80 However, the oil and gas 
industry has frequently been accused of the corruption of officials from the government, 
the national oil company and the international oil industry.81 Mainly due to international 
pressure, the Angolan government has taken some steps to improve transparency and 
accountability in the management of extractive industry revenues that previously helped 
fuel the country's devastating civil war, however there are still some outstanding issues 
concerning transparency in the industry that needs to be addressed.82 
Chad 
Chad is rich in gold, uranium and recently acquired the status as an oil producing and 
exporting state.83 According to the 2009 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Chad 
possessed proved oil reserves of 0.9 billion barrels at the end of 2008 or 0.1 per cent of the 
world's reserves.84 Chad is the fifth largest country in Africa but suffers from inadequate 
infrastructure, internal conflict, poverty and unfavourable health and social conditions.85 
Chad started oil production in 2003 with the construction of a pipeline to offshore 
oil-loading facilities on Cameroon's Atlantic coast. The objective of the $4 billion 
Chad--Cameroon pipeline project (1,070 km in length) is to develop the oil fields at Doba 
in southern Chad.86 The project is the main oil and gas-related project in the country and 
it has caused a lot of international attention. The main parties in the project included the 
World Bank, the governments of Chad and Cameroon, IOCs Chevron Texaco, Petronas, and 
ExxonMobil. However, during 2006 the Chadian government ordered ChevronTexaco and 
Petronas to leave the country for failure to pay taxes but the dispute has since been 
settled.87 Additionally, when the government moved to relax a law controlling the use of 
oil money, which the World Bank had made a condition of its $39m loan, it resulted in the 
withdrawal of the World Bank from the project.88 
Equatorial Guinea 
Equatorial Guinea, now regarded as a significant petroleum-producing nation and one of 
the leading areas for oil exploration in Africa, is ideally situated at the hub of the dynamic 
West Africa offshore petroleum province. Recently major offshore oil discoveries were 
made and encouraging prospects for additional discoveries have been identified. Petroleum 
production now dominates the economy with oil revenues accounting for over 70 per cent 
of the national income and the petroleum sector is *I.E.L.R. 119  the driving force behind 
the ongoing growth in Equatorial Guinea's GDP and the country's rapid development. 
Equatorial Guinea is the third largest oil exporter in West Africa after Nigeria and Angola. 
According to the World Bank, oil exports represent over 90 per cent of total export earnings 
and the oil revenues increased in value from $3 million in 1993 to $190 million in 2000 to 
$3.3 billion in 2006. From 2002 to 2006 the country experienced an average real annual 
GDP growth of 15.8 per cent.89 However, few people in the country have benefited from 
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the oil riches. 
Equatorial Guinea has joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) for 
transparency among oil-producing states, however it has made “only modest progress” to 
implement transparency initiatives, according to the International Monetary Fund.90 In 
2004, the corruption watchdog “Transparency International” has put Equatorial Guinea in 
the top 10 of its list of corrupt states.91 However, despite calls for more transparency in 
the sector, the President and government still protects the oil revenues under a cloak of 
secrecy.92 Despite the numerous charges of widespread corruption and a failed coup 
attempt in 2004 to overthrow the government, directly linked to its rich oil fields, the 
country continues attracting considerable interest and investment by the international oil 
industry.93 
Nigeria 
Nigeria is a member of OPEC and is the largest oil producer in Africa.94 However over the 
years, the local industry has build up a bad reputation both nationally and internationally, 
mainly through charges of corruption by government officials and oil companies.95 These 
charges mainly include the bribing of government officials for engineering, procurement 
and construction (EPC) contracts, and corrupt payments for preferential treatment during 
the customs process.96 
Other serious problems include disputes between government, indigenous and local 
communities over ownership claims, and the disruption to the industry mainly caused by 
groups of local militia including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) that use kidnappings and robbery as a means to force ransom payments from oil 
companies operating in the Niger Delta.97 Some argue that the rise in militancy among the 
youth in the Delta has been fuelled by extreme poverty and underdevelopment, discontent 
with the international oil companies, oil spillage and environmental damage, and 
corruption by government officials that ensures that little, if any, development funding 
reaches the host communities.98 The security problems in the Niger Delta region have cut 
Nigeria's output by a fifth in the last three years with current production levels less than 2 
million barrels per day.99 In 2000 the government adopted the Niger-Delta Development 
Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act to establish a new Commission (NDDC) that would: 
(a) formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger-Delta area; (b) 
conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and 
programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger-Delta area in the field of 
transportation, including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, 
industrialisation, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, 
electricity and telecommunications.100 The NDDC mandate entails the fast-tracking of the 
development of the Niger-Delta and pacifying the *I.E.L.R. 120  deeply-ingrained feeling 
of frustration often exhibited by the people in the region.101 Another major change in the 
energy sector includes the reorganisation of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC)102 as a response to the enormous challenges of survival and growth of the state 
corporation.103 
Ghana 
Recent discoveries of oil in Ghana have led to forecasts that the country will become 
Africa's next oil-boom state.104 The development of the potentially billion-barrel Jubilee 
offshore field is underway.105 The Petroleum (Exploration and Production Law), 1984 
(PNDC Law 84) regulates oil and gas activities in Ghana. The right of exploration, 
development or production of oil and gas is vested in the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC) and allows for an agreement with any person for the exploration and 
exploitation oil and gas in the country.106 Ghana operates on a royalty tax system, which 
draws a fixed percentage of revenue from production in the oil and gas fields.107 The 
government is also entitled to a 10 per cent carried interest and an option to acquire paid 
interest in producing fields.108 The question that is beyond the scope of this article is 
whether the success of the Ghanaian oil industry will result in the same pattern as the 
above countries in West Africa or will it stand out as an example of a producing West 
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African country with a successful and transparent oil and gas industry.109 
 Governance and transparency initiatives in relation to the oil and gas 
industry  
One of the many criticisms of the natural resources sector in most developing countries is 
that it is identified as the main source of wealth and power to government leaders and the 
international companies but with minimal or no real benefits to the citizens. Additionally, 
the view is widely held that some governments and industry players deliberately build their 
oil and gas relationships under complete obscurity which include secrecy of major 
agreements on production, refineries and pipelines; the lack of independent verification of 
oil production; no accountability; inadequate reporting requirements on oil and gas 
activities despite the guarantee for excessive profits.110 Consequently, mismanagement, 
competition for control and inequitable distribution of revenues from natural resources has 
fuelled cycles of corruption, energy instability, civil unrest, conflict and poverty, preventing 
opportunities for economic growth and social development.111 
The above examples show the need for effective civil service reform, the development and 
implementation of necessary structural and institutional measures, performance 
management and capacity building with high level leadership and political commitment, to 
ensure effective management of oil and gas revenues, the fight of poverty and the 
improvement of the lives of the citizens.112 
However, for most developing countries including the oil-rich West African countries, the 
development of transparent operating environments is a very slow and cumbersome 
process mainly because of the many political and financial constraints that will have to be 
overcome by all those involved. Some of the constraints for governments include weak 
individual and institutional capacity, little independence from more powerful executives 
and ruling political parties, and limited political will. Furthermore, government officials 
need to overcome the common misunderstanding that the industry's technical complexity 
is beyond their comprehension and address the serious lack of sufficient information and 
confidence to influence legislation, policy and the effective management of their oil and gas 
sector.113 
Therefore, in order to ensure sustainable development supported by a well-managed 
industry in which all citizens benefit from the oil and gas revenues there is a need to adopt 
a transparency agenda as a matter of urgency.114 It is now accepted that a transparent 
operating environment is in the interest of the resource-rich country as it would attract 
foreign investment, lower the cost of market capital, and reduce the chances of civil unrest. 
A transparent business environment would also bring about better governance and less 
corruption which should result *I.E.L.R. 121  in a more favourable investment climate, 
improved fiscal management and ultimately better economic performance.115 
Internationally, the promotion of transparency in the oil and gas sector and the reduction 
of global corruption have become top priorities of the international development 
community in recent years.116 Some of the key international initiatives, of importance to 
the West African region, which seek to introduce accountability and transparency in the 
extractive industries, include the following: 
• The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched in 2002 as a new 
standard in collaboration between companies and governments, civil society and investors 
by requiring transparency over both payments made by extractives companies and 
revenues received by governments.117 EITI is becoming the internationally accepted 
standard for transparency in the oil, gas and mining sectors through recognising the 
important and relevant contributions of all stakeholders. As a voluntary initiative, it was 
recognised that for EITI to succeed in the long term and to be accepted as a global 
standard, it needs international credibility, a clear management and governance structure 
to take it forward and its supporters need to be able to explain clearly to others the benefits 
to be gained from implementation. Many IOCs and governments including the 
resource-rich West African countries support the EITI initiative. Of the 53 natural 
resource-rich countries in the world, more than half have now either committed to 
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implement EITI, or are well on their way to doing so.118 
• The EITI was enhanced in 2008 by the World Bank's announcement of the “Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative Plus Plus” (EITI++) to help developing countries 
manage and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that 
spreads the benefits more fairly among their people.119 The EITI++ initiative seeks to 
develop national capability to handle the boom in commodity prices, and channel the 
growing revenue streams into fighting poverty, hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and 
disease.120 
• The issue of corruption in the oil and gas sector is given prominence by international 
organisations121 including the UN through a number of important developments in 
international law, culminating in December 2005 with the entry into force of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.122 
• Together with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a number of other regional 
anticorruption conventions, all of the world's major economies including the US and UK are 
now legally committed to the international fight against corruption.123 The OECD 
Antibribery Convention is currently the most significant Treaty in this area in that it 
requires that the act of bribing foreign public officials be made a criminal offence. This 
means that as the provisions become fully implemented, the act of bribing officials in 
countries of high corruption will leave individuals and companies open to criminal liability in 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the other OECD Member States. This is bound 
to have an increasing impact on the attitude that large IOCs take to doing business in 
countries where corruption is endemic, and companies should definitely take the new 
measures into consideration when doing business in such countries. IOCs and other 
entities involved in the extraction of oil and *I.E.L.R. 122  gas resources need to actively 
support governments and international initiatives for greater transparency and the 
eradication of corruption in the oil and gas sector. 
 Conclusion  
The obvious answer to the question as to the huge interest, and attraction to the 
oil-producing regions of West Africa despite the many associated problems is that in most 
cases the individuals involved (companies and governments alike) have been creating 
enormous wealth and reaping significant dividends from the investments with very high 
rates of return to themselves and very minimal investment in the country and its people. It 
is clear that despite the inherent risk in investing in these conflict areas, there are massive 
opportunities for IOCs, individuals and governments along all phases of the industry's 
supply chain. It is notable that there are African countries that have well developed 
investment regimes with open and transparent approaches to foreign investment; however 
they do not seem to be as successful in attracting as much interest in oil and gas 
exploration and production as countries with clear problems of governance and instability. 
A range of international companies including US, European, Russian and Chinese 
companies have been participating at all levels in the West African oil and gas industry for 
many years and they have now been joined by their governments that have a keen interest 
in tapping the rich African resources, in some cases even if it means directly conniving with 
the political elite. The number of global initiatives that have been adopted by industry, 
international organisations and governments including the West African oil-producing 
governments indicates a change of the general negative image of the oil industry that has 
been tainted over the years by issues of corruption, bribery, political risk and security 
problems, etc. Sadly, many of these problems are still prevalent in West Africa. It would 
therefore still require a huge effort from all players involved to develop a transparent 
industry that would ensure proper compensation to the local population for the exploitation 
of their natural resources. 
Finally, with the abundance of natural resources, the huge interest in the development of 
the region's oil and gas resources, the various international initiatives on public sector 
reform, transparency and anti-corruption, West African oil-producing countries (supported 
by the IOCs operating in the region) have a golden opportunity to tackle the above 
problems, transform their national economies and enhance the lives of all their citizens. 
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That is how it is supposed to be! 
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